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NOTE
The Darien Gap Case - Can Mere Words Interfere with the
Sovereignty of a Foreign Nation?
STUART WEINSTEIN-BACALL*
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 18, 1978, in Sierra Club v. Adams,I the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in holding the appellant
Government's Final Environmental Impact Statement2 (FEIS), as required
by the National Environmental Policy Act 3 (NEPA) for the Darien Gap
*J.D. candidate, University of Miami School of Law, B.A., M.Ed., University of Virginia. Mr.
Weinstein-Bacall is Managing Editor of the Lawyer of the Americas.
I. Sierra Club v. Adams, No. 76-2158 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 14, 1978).
2. Appellants are the Secretary of Transportation of the United States, currently Brock
Adams, Jr., and the Administrator of the Federal Highway Administration, currently William
M. Cox.
3. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970). Section
references in text and footnotes refer to Pub. L. No. 91-190. Section 102(2)(C) of the Act re-
quires that:
"to the fullest extent possible ... (2) all agencies of the Federal government shall ...
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the environment, a detailed statement
(EIS) by the responsible official on -
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long term productivity, and,
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult
with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or
special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such
statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local
agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall
be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality, and to the
public as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal
through the existing agency review processes. (emphasis added)
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Highway project4 (the Highway) adequate and sufficient, cleared the way
for the completion of the Pan-American Highway System. When the system
is completed it will stretch continuously from Prudhoe Bay, on the north
coast of Alaska, to Santiago, Chile5 and beyond, connecting numerous
capital cities of the Western Hemisphere. In reviewing on appeal the injunc-
tion requested by appellees6 and granted by the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia' the circuit court held. vacated and remanded,
the Government's FEIS was adequate, and the district court's holding that
the FEIS was deficient was, in view of the appropriate tests," erroneous.
II. BACKGROUND
The injunction granted by the district court prohibiting any further
construction of the Highway was thereby terminated, and the Department
of Transportation was authorized to continue construction on the Darien
Gap Highway in Panama,9 paving the way for the completion of the final
4. Pub. L. No. 91-605, 23 U.S.C. § 216, which reads in pertinent part:
(a) The United States shall cooperate with the Government of the Republic of Pan-
ama and with the Government of Colombia in the construction of approximately two
hundred and fifty miles of highway in such countries in the location known as the
'Darien Gap' to connect the Inter-American Highway authorized by section 212 of
this Title with the Pan American Highway System of South America. Such highway
shall be known as the 'Darien Gap Highway.' Funds authorized by this section shall
be obligated and expended subject to the same terms, conditions, and requirements
with respect to the Darien Gap Highway as are funds authorized for the Inter-
American Highway by subsection (a) of section 212 of this title.
See also Agreements with Panama (October 5, 1972 and June 12, 1974) and Colombia (August
18, 1973), U.S.T. 2485; T.I.A.S. No. 7482, 24; Agreement between the United States of
America and Panama (May 6, 1971) 22 U.S.T. 602; Agreement between the United States of
America and Colombia (May 6, 1971), 22 US.T. 617. These Agreements provide that the
United States will pay for two-thirds of the Highway and Panama and Colombia will be
responsible for the remaining one-third, and for rights of way, engineering personnel and main-
tenance of the Highway.
5. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 2. Presently, the portion of the highway from Prudhoe Bay,
Alaska to the Darien Gap is known as the Inter-American Highway, and the portion below, the
Pan-American Highway. When completed, the entire project will be known as the Pan-
American Highway.
6. Appellees are the Sierra Club, National Audobon Society, Friends of the Earth, Inc..
and International Association of Game, Fish and Conservation Commissioners.
7. The District Court for the District of Columbia, in Sierra Club v. Coleman, 405 F.
Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975), enjoined the building of the Highway for the Government's failure to
comply with the procedural and substantive requirements of NEPA by failing to file an EIS as
required by section 102(2)(C) of NEPA. On rehearing, Sierra Club v. Coleman, 421 F. Supp. 63
(D.D.C. 1976), the district court held that by filing an EIS, the Government had complied with
the procedural requirements of NEPA, but that in view of the court's determination that the
EIS was inadequate, had failed to comply with NEPA's substantive requirements. The injunc-
tion was therefore continued pending submission of an adequate EIS in compliance with the
substantive requirements of NEPA.
8. See notes 23, 40, 73, 75, 79, 85, 86, 94 infra and accompanying text for discussion of
those tests.
9. See Brief for the Federal Appellants, at 8: "There will be no construction until aftosa
control actually exists, as certified by the United States Department of Agriculture." See notes
18, 19, 45, 68-73 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of aftosa. See also notes 11, 69,
71 and 103 infra.
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portion of the Pan-American Highway System.10 Completion of the
Highway, when the Department of Agriculture (USDA) gives its final ap-
proval,'' will, for the first time by road, connect the North and South
American continents.
On June 27, 1975, the appellees sued in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia to temporarily enjoin further construction of
the Darien Gap Highway, and alleged that appellants, Secretary of
Transportation and Administrator of the Federal Highway Administration,
had failed to prepare a FEIS, as required by NEPA, evaluating the spectrum
of potential environmental impacts of the Darien Gap Highway. On Oc-
tober 10, 1975, after hearing arguments, the district court granted ap-
pellees' motion and enjoined further construction efforts on the Highway
until the Government complied with the procedural requirements of
NEPA.12 On June 15, 1976, the Government announced that it had com-
pleted preparation of its FEIS, and submitted same for the district court's
approval, requesting that the injunction be vacated. 3 Appellees moved the
district court to continue the injunction on the grounds that the FEIS was
inadequate in its discussion of the possible environmental impacts of the
project.' 4 The district court, although holding that appellants had complied
with the procedural requirements of NEPA, 5 granted appellees' motion,' 6
holding the FEIS inadequate on the three grounds urged by appellees:'1 (1)
Possible effects of an outbreak of an epidemic of aftosa,'5 or foot-and-
10. See Brief for the Federal Appellants at 3. The Darien Gap Highway will run approx-
imately 400 kilometers (250 miles) from Tocumen, Panama to Rio Leon, Colombia.
II. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 17. The Circuit Court remanded the case.to the district court
with the instruction that the Department of Agriculture certification with regard to
aftosa control in Colombia be filed with the district court and the appellees prior to
the initiation of any constructidn in that country.
12. See 405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975).
13. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 4.
14. 421 F. Supp. at 64.
15. Id. at65.
16. Id. at 68.
17. Id.
18. Brief for Appellees at 4:
Aftosa, or foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), is highly contagious and is considered to
be the most serious communicable livestock disease, attacking cattle and swine, also
sheep, goats, deer, elk, and bison. It may be spread by infected or carrier animals, or
by contaminated vehicles.
See also notes 119, 45, 68-73 infra and accompanying text for a further discussion of aftosa.
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mouth disease;" (2) alternate routes or plans for the highway;20 and (3)
primary and secondary effects of development on the Cuna and Choco In-
dian tribes who inhabited the Darien Gap region2 [hereinafter the "In-
dians" issue]. The district court, in agreeing with appellees' allegations, ex-
tended the injunction until the enumerated deficiencies were remedied, for-
bidding appellants or
their agents, officers, servants, employees and attorneys, and any
persons in active concert or participation with them ... from en-
tering into any contract, obliging any funds, expending any funds,
or taking any other action whatsoever in furtherance of construc-
tion of the Darien Gap Highway, except as specified by the Court's
Order of December 23, 1975 .... 22
III. THE CIRCUIT COURT'S DECISION
Appellants arguments
The Government appealed to the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia,23 asserting that the court should vacate
the district court's injunction on the grounds that the FEIS was adequate
19. Despite a rather protracted discussion of FMD in the FEIS. including an estimate that
if aftosa were to strike in the United States. the damage might create a loss of $10 billion in the
first year alone (421 F. Supp. at 65). the district court found the FMD discussion of the FEIS
inadequate. The court said. 421 F, Supp. at 66:
The FEIS. in other words, does nothing more than state the goals of the program:
while the discussion of the proposed operation of the Colombian program is ade-
quately detailed, it contains no reasoned analysis whatever of the likelihood that the
program will in fact become fully reliable- In light of the history of FMD control
efforts in that nation, such a discussion is indispegsable to consideration of whether
the transmission of the disease can be effectively prevented in the near future. And
without knowing the realistic likelihood of a reliable program during the relevant
period, the agency cannot rationally conduct the balancing process required by
NEPA. ... In order for the agency to give any meaningful consideration to the merit
of the proposed project, it must know what the possible funding requirements
associated with the project may be and whether such funds are likely to be available.
Without such knowledge the balancing mandated by NEPA cannot be seriously
undertaken.
20. Section 102(2)(C)(iii) of NEPA requires a detailed statement of alternatives to the
proposed action. The district court said. 421 F. Supp. at 67:
Unfortunately. little of the discussion is addressed to the environmental impact of
possible alternatives to the route actually selected (the Atrato route). Such a discus-
sion of the environmental impact of other land routes, such as the Choco route, is in-
dispensible, though they might cost more or be less feasible from an engineering
perspective.
See notes 74-75. 95 and 106 infra and accompanying text.
21. 421 F. Supp. at 66-67. While the EIS discussed impacts on the Darien Gap Indian
tribes as spanning the realm of possibilities from incorporation into the national economies to
cultural extinction, the court felt that since the FEIS "makes no attempt at serious
anthropological or ethnographic analysis of the impact of secondary development resulting
from the the Highway on these people," the EIS's treatment of the issue did not satisfy the re-
quirements of NEPA. For a further discussion of the "Indians" issue, see notes 34-37, 112, 118
infra and accompanying text.
22. 421 F. Supp. at 67-68.
23. D.C. Cir. No, 76-2158.
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and did satisfy the requirements of NEPA, as well as the district court's
definition of what an Environmental Impact Statement should be.24
The Government argued2" that its FEIS was in compliance with what
NEPA mandated in that it did "provide detailed discussion sufficient to
allow the agency decision maker to fully consider in his or her decisional
calculus the possible environmental effects of various alternative paths the
agency might choose to pursue with respect to a given project.' -  The
Government further argued 21 that it had presented the decisionmaker with
ample discussion of the "worst case" 25 environmental consequences in each
of the instances concerning which the district court had held the analysis in-
adequate. In addition, appellants alleged2" that the FEIS clearly presented
the decisionmaker with enough discussion to alert him to the problems.
which was all that was required in a FEIS. n1 They pointed out to the court
that the FEIS certainly provided a "hard look" at the aftosa problem,
without using a "crystal ball" analysis to predict future outbreaks of aftosa
in unknown locations, of unknown size, and at unknown dates.' The circuit
court, appellant argued. had previously held that "crystal ball" gazing of
such type need not be done.32
Appellants further contended that the FEIS discussion of alternate
routes was, simply, adequate. 3
As to the effect of the Highway on the Indian tribes located in the
Darien Gap region of Panama and Colombia,34 the Government argued
that it had sufficiently presented the range of possible effects the Highway
might have on the Indians,35 and that the district court's requirement of a
24. Id. at 65. See also Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States. 510 F.2d
796 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. Atomic Energy Commis-
sion. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973): Natural Resources Defense Council v- Morton. 458 F.2d
827 (D.C. Cir. 1972): Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v, Atomic Energy Commission.
449 F.2d 1109(D.C.Cir. 1971).
25. Brief for the Federal Appellants at 6-13.
26. See 421 F. Supp. at 65. See note 25 supra.
27. Brief for the Federal Appellants at 6.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 13.
30. See Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld. 555 F.2d 817 at 929 (DC. Cir 1977):
"NEPA does not mandate that every conceivable possibility.. . must be explored in an EIS"
3 I. Brief for the Federal Appellants at 9.
32. Id.
33. Id. at II. See also 555 F.2d at 825.
34. Brief for the Federal Appellants at 9. In assessing the district court's requirement that
the EIS contain a "serious anthropological or ethnographic analysis" of the impact on the In-
dians. the appellant pointed out that. in putting this requirement in perspective, it was worth
noting that the entire Darien Gap region of Panama contains only 1.6 percent of Panama's
population, and that the Choco and Cuna Indians comprise only twenty-two and two percent
of that 1.6 percent. respectively.
35. Brief for the Federal Appellants at 9-10. The appellants pointed out that the Cuna In-
dians are a very tightly knit tribe and were likely to resist - as they had done when they came
in contact with the Spanish. Colombian and Panamanian civilizations - any assimilation into
other cultures. The Choco Indians. appellants indicated, were simply expected to retreat from
and reject civilization again, as they had always done before, and move further up river. The
EIS further indicated that the possibilities of impact ranged from assimilation to cultural ex-
tinction.
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"serious anthropological or ethnographic analysis of the impact of second-
ary development resulting from the Highway upon these people"'3 6 was not
necessary. 7 Appellants argued that FEIS "was not intended to be a sub-
stitute community planning device," 38 and that the district court was asking
the FEIS "to do too much when it is asked to go deeply into local
planning."3 9
The Government based its prayer for relief on the circuit court's 'rule
of reason" analysis,40 and asserted that the FEIS plainly contained enough
information to appraise the decisionmaker of the environmental problems.
and therefore enabled him or her to make a reasoned decision.
4 1
Finally, although conceding that appellees had sufficient standing to
challenge the FEIS on its aftosa discussion, they asserted that appellees in-
terest in the "alternate routes" and the "Indians" portions of the FEIS was
too remote, relying on Harrington v. Bush," and that appellees therefore
lacked the requisite standing to challenge the FEIS on those issues."
Appellees arguments
Appellees, on the other hand, rested their arguments to the circuit court
on the rationale advanced by the district court for extending the injunction.
They detailed the potential dangers of the aftosa problem.4" pointing out the
significant deficiencies in the Colombian program for aftosa control.4s the
lack of seriously adequate discussion of the Highway's impact on the Indian
tribes in the region,46 and the lack of sufficient discussion of (a) alternate
routes for, and (b) alternatives to the Highway. 47
Citing appellants concession of its standing to challenge the aftosa dis-
cussion in the FEIS,46 appellees argued elaborately in order to convince the
circuit court that that standing should extend to encompass challenges to
the "alternate routes" and "Indians" portions of the FEIS.4 Citing Sierra
36. See note 21 supra.
37. Brief for the Federal Appellants at I.
38. Id. at 10.
39. Id. at 11.
40. See generally 555 F.2d 817: "In essence, then. '(t)he court's task is to determine
whether the EIS was compiled with objective good faith and whether the resulting statement
would permit a decisionmaker to fully consider and balance the environmental factors.' " See
cases cited in note 24 supra.
41. Brief for the Federal Appellants at 13.
42. 553 F.2d 190 (D.C.Cir. 1977).
43. Brief for the Federal Appellants at 14.
44. Brief for Appellees at 15-18. See notes 2 1. 22 supra,
45. Brief for Appellees at 16. 17. Appellees pointed out that the aftosa control program for
Colombia does not appraise the probability of its effectiveness. It was also indicated that. at the
USDA Advisory Committee on Foreign Animal and Poultry Disease. in June 1976. it was con-
cluded "that the precautions taken to date by Colombia are not adequate." Also discussed by
appellee was the extreme cost of aftosa control as evidenced by other projects,
46. Brief for Appellees at 19-25.
47. Id. at 25.
48. Id. at 30.
49. Id at 30-35.
THE DARIEN GAP CASE
Club v. Morton5 ° and Warth v. Seldin,5 ' appellees urged that their standing to
challenge one portion of the FEIS properly entitled them to "argue the
public interest in securing faithful performance by the defendant of their
statutory duties." 2 Appellees also contended 3 that, in any event, they were
injured by appellant's failure to adequately discuss the problems of the In-
dians and the alternate routes for the Highway, in that their members would
be injured in their use and enjoyment of "'the Dairen Gap area in its virgin
state as the result of Defendant's failure to comply with NEPA."5' Ad-
ditionally, they alleged that the failure to adequately discuss these conse-
quences adversely affected the dissemination of information and the
educational activities of appellees' respective organizations.
5
The circuit court, although agreeing with appellees' contention that its
standing on the aftosa issue entitled it to challenge the FEIS on the "alter-
nate routes" and "Indians" issues, via its "public interest" argument,56
found, after considerable discussion, that the Government's FEIS was
adequate and did comply with the requirement of NEPA.5 7 An analysis of
that discussion follows.
The Court's reasoning
The circuit court's reasoning on the issue of appellees' standing to
challenge alleged deficiencies in the FEIS. particularly as regards the en-
vironmental effects of secondary development along the Highway on the
Choco and San Bias Cuna Indians, has subtle but potentially significant im-
pact in the areas of international law and the conduct of United States
foreign relations.5 Those profound implications will be discussed subse-
quent to an evaluation of the court's rationale in holding the FEIS to be
adequate.
The circuit court found that since there were no material facts in dis-
pute. the appeal would constitute "an essentially de novo review," because
the court was "in as good a position as the district court to determine...
what could reasonably be demanded of the EIS in issue. '"" Citing Aberdeen
and Rockfish Railroad v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP),0 the circuit court indicated that "the question of the proper
scope of review by a court of the adequacy of an environmental impact
statement" was "still open."'" Further, the court said that it was governed
50. 405 U.S. 727(1972).
51. 422 U.S. 490(1975).
52. Brief for Appellees at 30.
53. Idat 34.
54. Id
55. Id. See also 481 F.2d 1079.
56. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 7.
57. Id at 14,
58, See generalv Note. The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA's Environmental Impact State-
mewt Requiremenits. 74 Mich. L. Rev. 349 (1975): See also text accompanying notes 108-
113.128.149 and 167 infra for further discussion.
59. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2 158 at 9.
60. 422 U.S. 289 at 326-27 n.28 (1975).
61. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 9.
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by a "rule of reason," as determined by it in such cases as Carolina Environ-
mental Study Group v. United States, 2 "to determine whether the EIS was
compiled with objective good faith and whether the resulting statement
would permit a decisionmaker to fully consider and balance the environ-
mental factors. '6 Guided by these principles, the circuit court found on the
merits, contrary to the evaluation of the district court, that the FEIS was
filed in good faith and met the requirements of NEPA. 4 Citing several
cases 6-1 the court noted that one indication of the good faith submission of
an EIS is the manner in which the Government agency responds to the com-
ments of adverse interests to its project.66 The court determined that the
Government had done this more than adequately in its EIS with respect to
the adverse comments of appellees. 7
Aftosa
In considering the possible environmental impact of aftosa. the court
separated the effects of that consideration with respect to Panama from that
regarding Colombia." Since aftosa has been controlled north of the Colom-
bian border, the court felt that the FEIS' handling of that problem was more
than adequate. Since the Highway portion in Colombia could not be opened
until the USDA had certified that aftosa control in Colombia was ade-
quate 9 (and since aftosa control program in Panama was already effec-
tive7 ) the court concluded that the discussion of aftosa - which said that
since USDA certification was required prior to the opening of the Colombia
portion of the Highway the increased risk of an outbreak of aftosa in the
United States due to the construction of the Darien Gap Highway in Pan-
ama was insignificant" - was sufficient to apprise the decisionmaker of the
environmental consequences.72 Therefore, the court concluded, the require-
ments of NEPA, as enunciated in Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld,
3
were met.
62. 51 OF.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
63. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 10. See also 510 F.2d at 819.
64. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 11. The Court felt it significant that neither the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) nor the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) objected to the
draft statement. In fact, the Court noted, the EPA remarked that the draft "adequately sets
forth the environmental impact of the proposed action." The Court commented that this was
particularly noteworthy because of the crucial roles of both the CEQ and the EPA in the en-
vironmental area. See also Aberdeen and Rockfish Railroad v, SCRAP. 422 U.S. at 328
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
65. See National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995. 1003 I10th Cir. 1973). cert.
denied. 416 U.S. 993 (1974): Sierra Club v. ICC. No. 76-1557. slip.op. at 14-15 (D.C Cir. Feb.
21. 1978).
66. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at II.
67. Id.: "'Most notably. counsel for appellees submitted eight pages of comments. and the
Government included these pages and five pages of responses in the FEIS."
68. Id. at 12.
69. See note II supra.
70. Id.
71. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 13.
72. Id. at 14.
73. 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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Alternatives
Citing National Resources Defense Council v. Morton,74 where the cir-
cuit court enunciated the "rule of reason" test with regard to the FEIS, the
court felt that, since the FEIS explored the various non-highway alternatives
as well as a "no-action" alternative, and briefly but adequately discussed
less feasible routes within the Darien Gap region, the exposition of alter-
natives was ample.
7
"
Indians
As to the impact of development of the Cuna and Choco Indian tribes.
the court was disturbed by the Government's rather cursory treatment of
that issue.76 but allowed that the discussion was adequate to satisfy NEPA7'
in that it considered the entire range of possible effects - from assimilation
to extinction - thereby allowing the decisionmaker to balance the ap-
propriate environmental factors.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT'S OPIN ION
The Environmental Impact Statement
It is submitted that in holding the Government's FEIS adequate. the
court was exercising proper judgment in evaluating the plethora of
pronouncements found in its numerous antecedent decisions delineating the
scope of NEPA's FEIS requirement. 7" Although. as the court indicated, the
proper scope of review by a court of the adequacy of an EIS is still open.
7
1
the parameters of the review have been relatively well defined by the Circuit
Court's previous decisions. The District of Columbia Circuit's long history
of litigation involving the FEIS process and its application to major federal
projects has interpreted section 102 of NEPA very broadly. until virtually
any federal action can be brought within the scrutiny of NEPA's EIS re-
quirement8 0
The history of EIS analysis in the District of Columbia Circuit from
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission,"' in
which Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright pronounced that the courts have the
power to require agencies - in that case the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) - to comply with the procedural requirements of NEPA ("our duty,
in short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of
Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal
74. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
75. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 15.
76. Id. at 16. See also note 34supra.
77. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 16.
78. See generally cases cited in note 24 supra• See also note 80 infra.
79. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 9-10. See also 422 U.S. at 326-27 n.28. The Court indicated,
though, that the contours of the review were relatively well defined, alluding to the "rule of
reason," "objective good faith," and "balancing of environmental factors" tests previously
enunciated by it and other circuit courts.
80. See general/v Friedman. The Environmental Impact Statement Process. Case and
Coniment. Nov-'Dec . 1977. at 28-37.
81. 449 F.2d 1109(D.C. Cir. 1971).
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bureaucracy")," to Rumsfeld, 3 where the court held that there was no sup-
port for the Navy's argument that there was an implied "national defense"
exemption from the requirements of NEPA, 4 indicates that NEPA's re-
quirement of submission of an EIS be interpreted and evaluated by the
courts using a "rule of reason." 85 As the court said in Carolina Environmen-
tal Study Group, "the AEC is required by NEPA to set forth the factors in-
volved, to the end that the ultimate decision on a proposed course of action
shall be enlightened by prior recognition of its impact on the quality of the
human environment." 6 As the court recently enunciated in Rumsfeld, "the
FEIS does not mandate that every conceivable possibility which someone
might dream up must be explored in an EIS." 8
Considering the guidelines it had developed over the years, the court
properly found that the appellants' FEIS complied with the procedural and
substantive requirements of NEPA. Significantly, the court pointed out that
neither of the agencies most intimately concerned with the content of the
EIS, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), objected to the Government's assertion that its
EIS adequately "set forth the environmental impact of the proposed ac-
tion.""8 Further, citing National Helium Corp. v. Morton" and Sierra Club v.
ICC 0 the court commended the FEIS inclusion of comments on its
proposals, particularly the inclusion of the eight pages of adverse comments
submitted by counsel for the appellees.11
The court properly found that the FEIS discussion of aftosa,2 which
was quite frank," supplied "in reasonable detail the information a decision-
maker would require to balance and to consider fully the environmental fac-
tors of a decision to proceed, and this is all the NEPA requires." 9
The FEIS discussion-of alternatives as required by NEPA was, as
previously indicated," "when read as a whole ... an ample exposition, from
an environmental standpoint, of the relative merits of both the chosen and
alternative routes."' 96 As set out in Natural Resources Defense Council, the
discussion of alternatives did not require a "crystal ball" analysis,97 but
rather a reasonable discussion, which, as the court indicated, was provided
in the FEIS.9 8
82. Id at I111
83. 555 F.2d 817(D.C- Cir 1977).
84. Id. at 823.
85. Id. at 827.
86. 510 F.2d at 799. This would apply as well to any other federal agency involved.
87. 555 F.2d at 829.
88. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 10. See also note 64 supra: FEIS at 12. 1.
89. See note 65 supra.
90. Id.
91. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 10.
92. See notes 18. 19. and 45. 69supra and accompanying text,
93. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 13.
94. Id. at 14.
95. See notes 20. 74-75 supra and accompanying text.
96. DC. Cir. No. 76-2158at 15.
97. 555 F.2d at 827. See text accompanying notes 31 and 32supra.
98. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 16.
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The court, in pointing out that the FEIS discussion of the environmen-
tal impact on the Cuna and Choco Indians was one of its most detailed dis-
cussions, -concluded that, in view of the previous pronouncements of the
court on the applicability of NEPA, "because the decisionmaker was
presented with the entire range of these interpretations, in sufficient detail to
allow him to balance the appropriate environmental factors, we believe
NEPA's requirements have been met."' 00 The court therefore properly, in
light of the interpretative history of NEPA's EIS requirement, vacated the
district court's injunction, and permitted the Government to continue con-
struction of the Darien Gap Highway's Panama portion, 0' an action which
will surely enhance the position of the United States vis-e6-vis its
relationships with the nations of Latin America and, perhaps, other
developing nations.
One interesting and amusing sidelight to the decision is worth noting.
Apparently confident that its oral argument had won the hearts and minds
of the circuit court judges, the Government prematurely implemented the
fruits of its anticipated victory. It included in the United States' 1979 fiscal
budget the statement: "Construction (of the Darien Gap Highway) has been
delayed for two construction seasons by the courts pending satisfactory
completion of certain environmental requirements. These requirements have
been met."102 (court's italics). The court, somewhat disturbed by the
Government's anticipatory confidence, closed its opinion by saying,
"(H)owever, because the Government may be a bit too anxious to
complete this project, we remand this case to the district court with
the instruction that the Department of Agriculture certification
with regard to aftosa control in Colombia be filed with the district
court and the appellees prior to the initiation of any construction in
that country."'
0 3
The court stated further:
The fact that this document [the Budget request] was submitted to
Congress on January 20, 1978, after oral argument but before final
decision in this case, leads us to continue judicial supervision of the
project. While we recognize that oversights can occur in an under-
taking as vast as preparing a $500 billion budget, we must also
recall that vitally important environmental concerns are present in
this case.10 4
The Court's Standing Determination
Although no quarrel can be had with the court's finding that appellees
had standing to sue with respect to the issues of aftosa control" 5 and alter-
99. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 16. See also FEIS at 6-27 to 6-31.
100. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 16.
101. dat 17.
102. Id. at 17. See Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1979. appendix
1037(1978).
103. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 17.
104. Id. at 17 n.43 (Court's italics).
105. Id. at 5. See also Brief for the Federal Appellants at 14.
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natives to the proposed Highway,016 strong exception is taken to the court's
determination that the appellees be allowed standing to sue with respect to
alleged deficiencies in the FEIS discussion of the impacts of secondary
development on the Cuna and Choco Indians in the Darien Gap region.',,
The determination that appellees could sue to have rendered deficient that
portion of the FEIS dealing with what is purely a domestic Panamanian
concern is pregnant with international implications and potential repercus-
sions, and may in fact constitute interference by the court in affairs which,
based on the Separation of Powers Doctrine, are soley within the purview of
the Executive and Legislative branches, l00 and within the exclusive domestic
jurisdiction of Panama. 0 9 The precedent is clearly a dangerous one, and its
possible ramifications will be evaluated below.
In holding that, since appellees had established an "independent basis"
for standing to challenge the FEIS, they also had standing to argue the
"public interest" in support of their claim that the portion of the FEIS deal-
ing with the Choco and Cuna Indians was inadequate," 0 the court expanded
much too far the cited dicta in Sierra Club v. Morton. ' Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton was a purely domestic case, and before extending its pronouncements
beyond domestic borders, the circuit court should first have considered, as
"intimated" by appellants," 21 that the applicability of NEPA might not ex-
tend to "purely local concerns""' 3 of a foreign sovereign nation.
Perhaps a brief discussion of standing, particularly as it applies to the
NEPA process, is in order prior to evaluating the potential dangers of the
court's decision. The construction of section 102(2)(C) of NEPA has been
specific enough to allow it to be the basis of a cause of action, and standing
has been liberally granted by the courts.'" With respect to challenges to
federal agency action abroad, standing could be claimed in several ways: (1)
Plaintiff could allege an "injury in fact," caused by the federal action
106. Id. at 6-9. Section 102(C)(iii) of NEPA provides for the FEIS to contain a detailed
statement on alternatives to the proposed action. It thus appears that courts would be rather
liberal in allowing standing to challenge inadequacies in discussions of these alternatives.
107. Id. at9.
108. See note 58supra and accompanying text.
109. See text accompanying notes 113. 150-171 infra.
110. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 6-9.
I1I. 405 U.S. at 727.
112. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 6. Supplemental bricfs were furnished at the Court's request
on the question of the applicability of NEPA to construction in Panama. The Government.
although not challenging NEPA's general applicability, intimated (though it should have
assered) that the position might not apply to "purely local concerns (Indians and Alternate
Routes)."
113. Id.
I i4. See notes 58 and 80supra and accompanying text.
THE DARIEN GAP CASE
abroad;" 5 (2) plaintiff could allege a right provided by NEPA to be in-
formed by, and offer comments on, the impact statement required for any
federal action, domestic or foreign;' 6 or (3) plaintiff, as a foreigner affected
by the federal action,1 7 could allege an "injury in fact."' ' 8
The appellees questioning of the FEIS as it applies to the Indian tribes
falls along none of these avenues to standing. While it is not disputed that
the "use of the term human environment in section 102(2)(C) of NEPA
reflects an intent to cover environmental impacts beyond U.S. borders,""
' 9
the question is, who can get standing to challenge which impacts.
While no case has yet held that an interest in one issue in a case permits
a party to litigate all other issues, 10 the court relied on dicta in Sierra Club v.
Morton, '2 and allowed appellees to argue the "Indians" issue. The re-
quisites for standing to sue - save by the court's analysis and application of
Sierra Club v. Morton - do not appear to be met here:
The essence of the standing question, in its constitutional
dimension "is whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his
invocation of federal court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of
the court's remedial powers on his behalf."'1
22
The Supreme Court, in Warth v. Seldin, also went on to indicate that
even if the plaintiff's injury is shared by a large class of other possible
litigants, it must still allege a "distinct and palpable injury to itself." 23 The
115. This was how appellees obtained standing originally in Sierra Club v. Coleman. 405
F. Supp. 61. This ground for standing was not disputed by appellant. See United States v.
SCRAP. 412 U.S. 669 for a more detailed analysis of this requirement.
116. See Brief for Appellees. at 34. Appellees contended that
[d]efendants' failure to prepare, circulate for comment, make available to the public,
and consider an EIS under NEPA concerning the Highway also adversely affects the
dissemination of information and educational activities of their organizations.
See also Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. Atomic Energy Commission. 481 F.2d
1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
117. See note 58 supra. See also Wilderness Society v. Morton. 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (Canadian citizen and Canadian environment group allowed to intervene in NEPA ac-
tion): People of Enewetack v. Laird. 353 F. Supp. 811. 820 n.14. (D. Haw. 1973) (granting
standing to nonresident aliens living in U.S. trust territory).
118. It appears that the Cuna and Choco Indians would therefore be the proper parties
before the Court challenging deficiencies in the FEIS as it applied to a discussion of the en-
vironniental impacts on their tribes.
119. Council on Environmental Quality: Memorandum to Heads of Agencies on Apply-
ing the EIS Requirement to Environmental Impacts Abroad. Sept. 24. 1976.
120. Brief for the Federal Appellants at 15.
121. 405 U.S. at 737.
122. Warth v. Seldin. 422 U.S. 489-490. quoting Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186. at 204. See
also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation. 97 S.
CL. 555 (1977).
123. 422 U.S. at 501. See also United States v. SCRAP. 412 U.S. 669(1973.
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Supreme Court added,1 24 and the circuit court relied heavily on this state-
ment: 2I
But so long as this requirement is satisfied, persons to whom
Congress has granted a right of action, either expressly or by clear
implication, may have standing to seek relief on the basis of the
legal rights and interests of others, and, indeed, may invoke the
general public interest in support of their claim.'26
It is submitted that the circuit court's use of this principle to allow the
Sierra Club standing to challenge the "Indians" portion of the FEIS was a
misapplication of the Supreme Court's intent. Although it can be and has
been implied that NEPA was intended by Congress to be applied ex-
traterritorially,127 it is a long way from that conclusion to holding that a
party can, once standing is obtained on an issue as to which that party can
allege a specific injury, argue any other issues it wishes to raise whether
specifically related to it or not. An illustration employing the case presently
under consideration, Sierra Club v. Adams, may be useful here in indicating
the dangers of the circuit court's reasoning. If the circuit court's findings
were altered slightly, it is entirely possible that the court could have found
that the FEIS of the Government was inadequate, and therefore not in com-
pliance with the substantive requirements of NEPA, solely on the basis that
its discussion of the potential environmental impacts on the Indian tribes
was deficient. The Highway construction could then have been enjoined on
this ground alone. The potentially dangerous implications with respect to
the conduct of American foreign policy in situations of this type should be
clear - any organization which could obtain standing to challenge any
federal action abroad could allege frivolous deficiencies in a FEIS solely in
order to delay or disrupt that action. 2 ' The Government, in fact, argued to
the court that "[t]he plaintiff's only interests in the Indians are that they be
studied as long as possible, and that the road be pictured as very damaging
to them . . . As far as the Choco Indians are concerned, plaintiff's interest
may be opposite to the Tribes." I"
Furthermore, there is no apparent public interest here for the Sierra
Club to champion (except perhaps that of Panamanians and Colom-
124. 422 U.S. at 501.
125. D.C. Cir. No. 76-2158 at 8. The Court here cited a number of older cases to bolster its
evaluation of the situation: Scripps Howard Radio. Inc. v. FCC. 316 US. 4. 14-15 0942). FCC
v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station. 309 U.S. 470. 477 (1940): National Wildlife Fedcration v.
Snow. 561 F.2d 227. 237 n. I (D.C. Cir. 1976): Otfice of Communication of the United Church
of Christ v. FCC. 359 F.2d 994 1000-10006. (D.C. Cir. 1966). These cases. though. have not
consistently been followed,
126. 422 U.S. at 501. See also 405 U.S. at 737: 309 U.S. at 477.
127. See generally CEQ Memorandum, supra note 119; 74 Mich. L. Rev. 349, supra note
58. See also 15 I.L.M. 679 (1976); 15 I.L.M. 984 (1976).
128. Since standing to challenge an EIS may be allowed by challenging the alternative's
discussion (§ 102(C)(iii) of NEPA) or the dissemination requirements of§ 102(C). it would be
easy for a plaintiff to then challenge other aspects of the EIS which have absolutely no applica-
tion to or bearing on that plaintiff.
129. Brief for the Federal Appellants at 15.
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bians), 130 and the court's acknowledgement of appellees argument is a fine
example of judicial legerdemain - a superficial attempt to find a basis for
the Sierra Club's standing to challenge the "Indians" portion of the FEIS.
Perhaps the court was "throwing a bone" to the appellees since, on the
merits of the case, it found against them. Regardless of the court's motiva-
tion in allowing appellees standing to argue the "Indians" issue, the poten-
tial effect of the decision, as indicated above,"' could be devastating.
Prior to advancing other policy arguments cautioning against the
court's analysis of the standing requirements, it is worth noting two cases
heavily relied upon by appellant in attempting to defuse appellees standing
allegations. In Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, ' the circuit court
denied standing to Senator Lee Metcalf of Montana to challenge alleged im-
proper influence of petroleum industry special interests on the National
Petroleum Council. The court found that the Senator had alleged no "par-
ticular concrete injury" which amounted to "a claim of specific present
objective harm or a threat of specific future harm." ' In its conclusion, the
court said:
The Supreme Court has stated that the standing doctrine "is
founded in concern about the proper - and properly limited -
role of the courts in a democratic society."' 34 The requirements
relating to standing have been developed to ensure that a party in-
voking a federal court's jurisdiction does not do so in a manner in-
consistent with the constitution or sound prudential limitations...
Such a role as the "continuing monitors of the wisdom and
soundness of Executive action"' 5 is clearly inappropriate for the
courts.'
In Harrington v. Bush,' 37 the court said that "the proper inquiry is
whether the illegality does injury to an interest of the complaining party."
and "there is no single test or formula to be derived from the case law to
determine if a particular party has standing to sue."' 35 In Harrington v.
Bush, the case most heavily relied upon by appellants in denying appellees
standing to sue on the "Indian" question, 3 the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court indicated that four requirements must be met before allowing a
party standing: Injury, interest, causation, and, as enunciated recently by
the Supreme Court in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization, 110 a plaintiff must be able to show "an injury that is likely to
be redressed by a favorable decision."'' This is not possible in the situation
130. See note 118 supra
131 See lext accompanying notes 108-113.supra.
132. 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
133. 553 F.2d at 183. (Court's italics).
134. See 422 U.S. at 498.
135. See Laird v, Tatum, 408 U.S. 15 (1972).
136. 553 F.2d at 189-190. (Court's italics).
137. 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
138. Id. at 205.
139. Brief for the Federal Appellants at 15.
140. 426 U.S. 26.
141. 426 U.S. at 38.
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here under scrutiny. This requirement "insures the framing of relief no
broader than required by the precise facts to which the court's ruling would
be applied." '42 The court said that the requirement of an "injury in fact"
was a Constitutional requirement designed to implement in part the Article
III limitation on federal judicial power to "cases or controversies." "I
The circuit court went on to say that "were the rules of standing
otherwise, a court either would have to accept the subjective feelings of in-
jury expressed by litigants, or would have to make these judgments itself on
a subjective basis.""' 4 and indicated that the problems there, as here. were
obvious.
Furthermore, the court said, "[just as it is well established that a mere
'interest in a problem' . . . is not sufficient by itself,'4' neither is the mere
relevance of a challenged activity to an asserted interest sufficient to invoke
the power of the federal judiciary."4 In view of the circuit court's recent
analysis of the standing issue in the above noted cases, it is difficult to com-
prehend why the court relied on such antiquated cases as it did' in allowing
appellees standing to sue on the Indian question in the FEIS.
In allowing appellees standing in this regard the court has created.
although perhaps unintentionally, the precise situation it cautioned against
in Harrington v. Bush. when, in answer to its own quaere as to the conse-
quences of too lenient standing requirements. it admonished:
To accept these grounds for standing would in effect allow
any Congressional suit to challenge Executive action, and an in-
dividual legislator would have a roving commission to obtain
judicial relief under most circumstances. This would lead in-
evitably to the intrusion of the courts into the proper affairs of the
co-equal branches of government."'
The analogies to the case herein being reviewed are readily apparent.
Similar to those discussed in Harrington v. Bush. challenges by environmen-
tal groups of federal agency actions abroad, if allowed even when frivolous
simply by being attached to a valid claim for which there is standing, would
seriously impair the efforts of Executive agencies. with the aid of Congress.
toward the effective implementation of foreign policy decisions.
142. 553 F.2d at 205 n.68. quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War.
418 U.S- 20 8 at 22 2 (19 74 ).
143. 553 F.2d at 206. quoting Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp. 397 U.S. 150 at 151 (1970).
144. 553 F.2d at 205 n.18.
145. See 405 U.S. at 739.
146. 553 F.2d at 209.
147. See cases cited in note 125supra,
148. 553 F.2d at 214. What is said here about a Congressional suit and an individual
legislator would also apply to an environmental group's suit or an individual environmental
group.
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If federal agency actions abroad are to be challenged, as has already
been conceded that they may justifiably be, 4 ' they should only be
challengable on the grounds that the group or individual challenging them
can allege a specific injury caused by the agency action being challenged.
V. THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
An analysis of the documents of such international and regional
organizations as the United Nations and the Organization of American
States, as well as of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference's Infor-
mal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), I'0 argues rather cogently on
behalf of the above proposition. It has been said by one commentator
regarding the extraterritorial application of NEPA that "neither the denial
of United States assistance nor the imposition of conditions on assistance
would appear to be an infringement upon foreign sovereignty." '" In view of
the pronouncements contained in the documents to be discussed below, it is
vigorously submitted that that proposition is untrue. If cultural, economic
or political concessions are to be extracted as a quid pro quo for United
States' foreign assistance, such demands should be made prior to the
promising of aid, and the appropriation thereof by the Congress, rather
than through the courts as was potentially the case in Sierra Club v. Adams
after the money has been appropriated and is in the process of being spent
abroad.
The CEQ has said 52 that "we believe such analysis [NEPA review] can
be accomplished without imposing U.S. environmental standards on other
countries, and without interfering with the execution of foreign policy."' 51 It
is again submitted that this analysis is incorrect.
In view of the fundamental restructuring of the global political
framework which has been occurring with increasing rapidity since World
War II, especially as can be seen in the current United Nations Third Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea, the nations of the earth are currently engaged
in developing and delimiting what has been termed the New International
Economic Order (NIEO). I" These alterations of the global framework have
been accelerating at a phenomenal pace, as can be seen by evaluating the
numerous documents which have emanated from the United Nations and
149. See note go supra and accompanying text.
150. See United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Seas (UNLOS 111). Informal
Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT). UN Doc A/Conf. 62/WP. 10. adopted July 15. 1977.
151. See 74 Mich L. Rev. supra note 58. at 378.
152. See CEQ Memorandum. supra note 119.
153 Id. at 2.
154. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEOi.
G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI). adopted May 9. 1974. U.N. Doc. A/Res/3201 IS-VI). reprinted in 13
I.L.M. at 715(1974).
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other regional organizations in the past decade,' s as well as by considering
the sheer numerical increase (to over 150) of the nations presently par-
ticipating in global decisionmaking processes.
A survey of these documents indicates that the conclusions of the CEQ
and other commentators on the subject. as well as the "standing" portion of
the decision of the circuit court in Sierra Club v. Adams as it relates to the
"Indians" issue, may well be erroneous, or at least anachronistic, in view of
the realities of the NIEO. It would appear from these documents that per-
mitting environmental groups to have standing to challenge issues which
arise wholly within the domestic jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign and have
no injurious impact on the group alleging standing would, in the view of the
developing countries at least, constitute an interference with their sovereign
rights.
These international documents are replete with acknowledgements by
the developing nations of their perceptions of the shrewdness in the tech-
niques which they feel may be employed by the developed nations in dealing
with them. A good policy argument against the type of indirect intervention
under scrutiny here is what has been termed "environmental imperialism"I"
that is, "an imposition of our environmental standards" on foreign nations
in exchange for United States dollars. 57 If in fact this is to be done by the
United States - conditioning foreign aid on particular environmental con-
cessions - it is again submitted that the conditions should be imposedprior
to the granting of aid, as granted in this case by the Darien Gap Resolution
and the Agreements appurtenant thereto. ' Otherwise, a situation could
easily develop where courts not only interfere with the Executive's conduct
of foreign policy, but where a court's "mere words could interfere with the
sovereignty of a foreign state."'I"
A few selections may serve to illustrate the Third World's concept of
the NIEO, and demonstrate its inherent wariness of the developed nations
power and methods.
Article 18 of the Charter of the Organization of American States"" ad-
monishes:
155. See general/v ICNT. note 150supra UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, adopted Jan. 15. 1975. G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. Doc. A/Res/3281 (XXIX). reprinted in 14
I.L.M. at 251 (1975): Declaration on the NIEO, note 154 supra. Declaration of the United Na-
tions Conference on the Human Environment. (Stockholm Convention). adopted June 16.
1972, UN Doc. A/Conf. 48/14. reprinted in I I I.L.M. at 1416 (1972): United Nations Declara-
tion on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States. U.N.G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV). adopted Oct. 24. 1970. reprinted in UN Monthly
Chronicle. November 1970: Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS Charter)
(1948) 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6845 ( as amended. Feb. 27. 1967). Pan American Union.
Treaty Series. No. lB.
156. See 74 Mich. L. Rev.. supra note 58. at 378.
157. Id.
158. See note 4 supra.
159. Thanks must he given to Professor Bernard Oxman of the University of Miami Law
School for assistance in the formulation of this concept,
160. See OAS Charter. supra note 155.
THE DARIEN GAP CASE
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectI. in the internal or external affairs of any other state. The
foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force. but also any
other .form of interference or attempted threat against the per-
sonality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural
elements.6
A United Nations Resolution'"2 of May 1974 calls for ~Extension of
active assistance to developing countries by the whole international com-
munity. free of any political or military conditions."'63 This would seem to
apply to allowing NEPA's EIS to be challenged on a "purely local" issue.""
The United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties '5 states:
Every state should cooperate with the efforts of developing
countries to accelerate their economic and social development by
providing favourable external conditions and by extending active
assistance to them, consistent with their development needs and
objectives, with strict respect for the sovereign equality of states
and free of any conditions derogating from their sovereignty.
This appears to contemplate the type of activity under consideration here-
Although, of course, the liberal granting of standing to environmental
and other groups and individuals to challenge Environmental Impact State-
ments does not per se constitute interference with a foreign nation's
sovereignty, a case has herein been made to indicate the delicate nature of
the considerations involved in an issue which was readily glossed over by the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in Sierra Club v. A damns.
Keeping in mind such declarations as the Stockholm Convention" 7 and
the Government's concessions to its significance.'" it would certainly be in
the best interests of the United States and its concomitant foreign policy -
as well as healthy for its world image - for the Supreme Court"' to
reevaluate the rather liberal standing requirements the District of Columbia
Circuit Court has established for challenging the discussions of an environ-
mental - and in the issue at hand, perhaps more of a cultural - impact
wholly within the domestic jurisdiction of a foreign state, before a flood of
litigation befalls them as various philosophically motivated interest groups
161. Id. at Art, 18 (emphasis added).
162. See note 154supra.
163, Id. Lit 718 (emphasis added).
164. See note I I2supra.
165. See note 155supra.
166. Id. at 258 (Art, 17) (emphasis added).
167 See Stockholm Convention supra note 155.
168. See CEQ Memorandum. supra note 119. at 2.
169. It is submitted that the Circuit Court should certify to the Supreme Court the ques-
tion of whether or not an alleged deficiency in an EIS filed pursuant to a federal agency action
abroad can be challenged by an individual or an organization which alleges no injury. either
direct or indirect, with regard to the particular environmental impact analysis sought to be
challenged. simply by appending it to a claim on which the plaintiff can obtain standing to sue.
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attempt to subvert or delay United States foreign projects throughout the
world. The United States would be far more respected and appreciated in
the Third World if it would, as a developed country. follow the proclama-
tion of the Stockholm Declaration and:
allow less developed countries [in this instance Panama] to direct
their efforts to development, bearing in mind their priorities and
the need to safeguard and improve the environment. For the same
purpose, the industrialized countries should make efforts to close
the "gap" between themselves and developing 'countries. 170
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the foregoing arguments, on the merits of the case of Sierra
Club v. Adams, the circuit court rendered a correct decision, and in so doing,
enabled the United States to contribute to the closing of the "gap"'' be-
tween itself (a developed country) and Panama (a developing country). In
this case, the "gap" being closed is the Darien Gap. Soon it will be possible
to take that long awaited drive from Prudhoe Bay to Tierra del Fuego.
170. See Stockholm Convention. supra note 155. at 716 (emphasis added)-
171. Id.
